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displacement rate provides crucial insight into the role of its legal system in
driving substantive eviction outcomes. The Essay then compiles existing
data on court displacement rates and compares those rates across
jurisdictions. This comparison reveals massive variation in court
displacement rates nationwide. In some jurisdictions, a tenant’s likelihood of
displacement upon receiving an eviction filing is approximately one in
twenty. In other jurisdictions, it is higher than one in two. The Essay outlines
the challenges involved in distilling the factors underlying this variation.
Notwithstanding these challenges, it identifies and assesses potential
explanations for the disparities. The Essay calls for empirical analysis to
understand precisely which parts of the eviction legal system—the
substantive laws, procedures, and access-to-justice factors—shape eviction
court outcomes.
AUTHOR—Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center; ABF/JPB Access to Justice Faculty Scholar. This research was
supported in part by the American Bar Foundation and the JPB Foundation.
I am grateful to Kathryn Sabbeth, the participants in the Northwestern
University Law Review 2021 Symposium, Reimagining Property in the Era
of Inequality, and to the editors of the Northwestern University Law Review
for very helpful feedback and suggestions. All errors are my own.

287

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 288
I.

COURT DISPLACEMENT RATES ACROSS JURISDICTIONS ........................................ 290

II.

UNDERSTANDING DIVERGENT EVICTION COURT OUTCOMES: AVENUES FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH .............................................................................................. 296

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 302

INTRODUCTION
Eviction is the ordinary, everyday way in which low-income Americans
interact with the U.S. property law system. Nearly four million eviction cases
are filed annually in the United States—over ten times the number of all civil
cases filed in the federal district courts.1 Landlords disproportionately file
these cases against people of color, women, and families with children.2 As
Matthew Desmond beautifully chronicled in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book
Evicted, eviction is endemic in the lives of poor families across both rural
and urban areas of the country.3
Over the past several years, in large part due to enormous datacollection efforts undertaken by the Princeton University Eviction Lab,
commentators have paid increasing attention to two statistics regarding
eviction: 1) the “eviction filing rate,” i.e., the percentage of renters in a
jurisdiction that receive an eviction filing annually, and 2) the “actual
1
See Ashley Gromis, Ian Fellows, James R. Hendrickson, Lavar Edmonds, Lillian Leung, Adam
Porton & Matthew Desmond, Estimating Eviction Prevalence Across the United States, PNAS (May
24, 2022), https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.2116169119 [https://perma.cc/3WJN-8KDB];
Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2020, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federaljudicial-caseload-statistics-2020 [https://perma.cc/9E4T-Y87E] (reporting 332,732 civil cases filed in the
federal district courts in 2020).
2
Matthew Desmond, Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118 AM. J. SOCIO. 88, 104
(2012); David Robinson & Justin Steil, Eviction Dynamics in Market-Rate Multifamily Rental Housing,
31 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 647, 664 (2021) [hereinafter Robinson & Steil, Eviction Dynamics]; DAVID
ROBINSON & JUSTIN STEIL, CITY LIFE VIDA URBANA, EVICTIONS IN BOSTON: THE DISPROPORTIONATE
EFFECT OF FORCED MOVES ON COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 1, 3, 6 (2020); ELAINA JOHNS-WOLFE,
CINCINNATI PROJECT, “YOU ARE BEING ASKED TO LEAVE THE PREMISES”: A STUDY OF EVICTION IN
CINCINNATI AND HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO, 2014-2017, at 7 (2018); AUBREY HASVOLD & JACK
REGENBOGEN, FACING EVICTION ALONE: A STUDY OF EVICTIONS, DENVER, COLORADO, 2014–2016, at
1, 2 (2017); Project, KAN. CITY EVICTION PROJECT, https://www.evictionkc.org/project
[https://perma.cc/9R9H-NWU4]; ZOE THIEL, MINNEAPOLIS INNOVATION TEAM, EVICTIONS IN
MINNEAPOLIS 2, 4 (2016), http://homelinemn.org/wp-content/uploads/Evictions%20in%20Minneapolis
%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9PX-XW5C]; Michael C. Lens, Kyle Nelson, Ashley Gromis &
Yiwen Kuai, The Neighborhood Context of Eviction in Southern California, 19 CITY & CMTY. 912, 923
(2020); IRA GOLDSTEIN, EMILY DOWDALL, COLIN WEIDIG, JANINE SIMMONS & BRIAN CARNEY,
REINVESTMENT FUND, POLICY BRIEF: EVICTIONS IN PHILADELPHIA: A DATA AND POLICY
UPDATE 7 (2019), https://www.reinvestment.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ReinvestmentFund__
PHL-Evictions-Brief-Oct-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT8D-3Q2G].
3
MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 296 (2016).
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eviction rate,” i.e., the percentage of renters that are ordered evicted by a
court annually.4 However, what has received less attention is the relationship
between these two rates. What is the actual eviction rate relative to the
eviction filing rate? In other words, once a landlord files an eviction case in
court, what is the likelihood that the tenant will be displaced? This statistic,
which I call the “court displacement rate,” provides crucial insight into the
role of the legal system in shaping eviction outcomes. It sheds light on where,
and to what extent, eviction courts limit the ability of landlords to dispossess
their tenants, or alternatively, the extent to which they enable landlords to
quickly recover possession. Likewise, this statistic offers the best clues into
the other roles the eviction legal system may play in structuring landlord–
tenant relationships.
This Essay empirically and theoretically explores the role of eviction
courts, laws, and procedures—what I refer to collectively as the “eviction
legal system”—in determining eviction outcomes. In doing so, it situates
eviction courts as sites of (re)distribution of property rights. It argues that
eviction courts across jurisdictions produce highly divergent distributional
outcomes, as measured by the court displacement rate, and that these
outcomes do not align neatly with the overall pro-landlord or pro-tenant
leaning of the substantive law. It further argues that while variations in court
displacement rates are certainly affected by housing market characteristics
and the extent to which landlords use eviction filings as a tool to collect rent
(rather than to obtain actual eviction), court displacement rates are not
merely a function of these factors. Instead, the Essay argues for the need to
more closely analyze procedural and substantive law factors that drive
4
See, e.g., Peter Hepburn, Renee Louis, Joe Fish, Emily Lemmerman, Anne Kat Alexander, Timothy
A. Thomas, Robert Koehler, Emily Benfer & Matthew Desmond, U.S. Eviction Filing Patterns in 2020,
SOCIUS: SOCIO. RSCH. FOR A DYNAMIC WORLD (Apr. 27, 2021), https://journals.sagepub.com/
doi/pdf/10.1177/23780231211009983 [https://perma.cc/A9YU-SAH4] (describing eviction filing rates in
2020); Olivia Jin, Emily Lemmerman, Peter Hepburn & Matthew Desmond, Neighborhoods with the
Highest Eviction Filing Rates Have the Lowest Levels of COVID-19 Vaccination, SOCIUS: SOCIO. RSCH.
FOR A DYNAMIC WORLD (Aug. 25, 2021), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/
23780231211040885 [https://perma.cc/N9S5-L9UQ] (exploring the association between eviction filing
rates and COVID-19 vaccination rates); Lillian Leung, Peter Hepburn & Matthew Desmond, Serial
Eviction Filing: Civil Courts, Property Management, and the Threat of Displacement, 100 SOC. FORCES
316, 320–21 (2021) (examining the rate of repeated eviction filings against households at the same
address); Robinson & Steil, Eviction Dynamics, supra note 2, at 648 (describing associations between
market-rate eviction filing rates and neighborhood racial composition); Gregory Preston & Vincent J.
Reina, Sheltered from Eviction? A Framework for Understanding the Relationship Between Subsidized
Housing Programs and Eviction, 31 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 785, 798–804 (2021) (examining associations
between eviction filing rates and subsidization status of properties); Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui, In
83 Million Eviction Records, a Sweeping and Intimate New Look at Housing in America, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/07/upshot/millions-of-eviction-records-asweeping-new-look-at-housing-in-america.html [https://perma.cc/2669-UZFT] (describing findings
from the Eviction Lab’s database of eviction filing rates and actual eviction rates across jurisdictions).
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distributional outcomes. While acknowledging and detailing the challenges
involved in performing such analyses, it sets forth an agenda for scholars to
do so.
The Essay begins by framing the court displacement rate as a statistic
that provides insight into the role of the court system in driving substantive
eviction outcomes. It then compiles existing data on court displacement rates
and compares those rates across jurisdictions. This comparison reveals
massive variation in court displacement rates across jurisdictions. In some
jurisdictions, a tenant’s likelihood of displacement upon receiving an
eviction filing is approximately one in twenty. In other jurisdictions, it is
higher than one in two. The Essay outlines the challenges involved in
distilling the factors underlying this variation. Notwithstanding these
challenges, it identifies and assesses potential explanations for the
disparities. The Essay calls for empirical analysis to understand precisely
which parts of the eviction legal system—the substantive laws, procedures,
and access-to-justice factors—shape eviction court outcomes.
Understanding the variation in court displacement rates across
jurisdictions and its underlying factors offers powerful clues into the types
of reforms to the legal system most likely to be effective in reducing actual
eviction. Many of the policy solutions advanced to reduce the prevalence of
eviction—substantive law reform, procedural reform, and access to
counsel—aim to intervene directly in the legal process. These reforms are all
founded on the assumption that the legal system matters for eviction
outcomes. In other words, they assume that eviction outcomes are not merely
a function of housing market dynamics or economic forces. Yet we lack
understanding about what specific parts of the eviction legal system matter,
how much they matter, and why. This Essay aims to set forth an agenda for
gaining this understanding and to contribute modestly towards advancing it.
I.

COURT DISPLACEMENT RATES ACROSS JURISDICTIONS

In 2018, the Princeton University Eviction Lab published a treasure
trove of data on eviction filings and eviction judgments nationwide,
compiled based on court records collected from an extraordinary number of
jurisdictions across the country. Prior to this, eviction data was largely
unavailable on a broad scale. The Lab gave the public and researchers alike
easy access to information on the “eviction filing rates” and the “eviction
rates” by city and state.5 The Lab defines the eviction filing rate as the

5
The Eviction Lab’s initial published data is from 2000–2016. The Lab drew on tens of millions of
court records in publishing its initial database. See About Eviction Lab, EVICTION LAB,
https://evictionlab.org/about [https://perma.cc/662T-KCJ8].
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number of eviction filings divided by the number of renter-occupied
households.6 It defines the eviction rate as the number of eviction judgments
divided by the number of renter-occupied households.7 Exposing the values
of these two rates across jurisdictions nationwide has contributed
enormously to our understanding of the prevalence of eviction. The data
demonstrates that some cities, such as Richmond, Virginia, are eviction “hot
spots,” with eviction filing rates as high as 28.9% and eviction rates as high
as 9.6%, whereas in other locations eviction is far less common.8
Both the eviction filing rate and the eviction rate serve as helpful
statistics for understanding the scope of eviction and its consequences.
Overall, the eviction filing rate captures the extent to which tenants in a
particular jurisdiction are vulnerable to being brought into court to defend
against an eviction case. Simply facing eviction through receipt of an
eviction filing, regardless of the case outcome, has been shown to result in a
host of adverse outcomes for tenants.9 Among other consequences, records
of eviction filings are widely used by landlords to screen out tenants,
resulting in substantial barriers to securing future housing for any tenant who
has received an eviction filing.10 Meanwhile, the eviction rate captures the
6
See MATTHEW DESMOND, ASHLEY GROMIS, LAVAR EDMONDS, JAMES HENDRICKSON, KATIE
KRYWOKULSKI, LILLIAN LEUNG & ADAM PORTON, EVICTION LAB METHODOLOGY REPORT: VERSION
1.0, at 35, 42 (2018), https://evictionlab.org/docs/Eviction%20Lab%20Methodology%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/25H9-M5X7].
7
Id. The Eviction Lab excludes “serial filings”—multiple filings made against the same household
within a short period of time—from the eviction rate but not the eviction filing rate. See id.
8
Eviction Data for Richmond, Virginia, EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/map
[https://perma.cc/BFA8-QYFS] (choose “Original Data” from dropdown; then search for “Richmond
City, Virginia”).
9
Jack Tsai, Natalie Jones, Dorota Szymkowiak & Robert A. Rosenheck, Longitudinal Study of the
Housing and Mental Health Outcomes of Tenants Appearing in Eviction Court, 56 SOC. PSYCHIATRY &
PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 1679, 1684–85 (2021); Hugo Vásquez-Vera, Laia Palència, Ingrid Magna,
Carlos Mena, Jaime Neira & Carme Borrell, The Threat of Home Eviction and Its Effects on Health
Through the Equity Lens: A Systematic Review, 175 SOC. SCI. & MED. 199, 199–206 (2017)
(summarizing findings from a collection of articles). But see John Eric Humphries, Nicholas S. Mader,
Daniel I. Tannenbaum & Winnie L. van Dijk, Does Eviction Cause Poverty? Quasi-Experimental
Evidence from Cook County, IL 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26139, 2019)
(suggesting that the adverse effects of eviction on financial health are “much more moderate” than many
sources estimate).
10
See generally Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Erasing the “Scarlet E” of Eviction Records, APPEAL (Apr. 12,
2021), https://theappeal.org/the-lab/report/erasing-the-scarlet-e-of-eviction-records/ [perma.cc/2DFCXAY4] (describing how a prior eviction can substantially reduce one’s ability to secure future housing);
Esme Caramello & Nora Mahlberg, Combating Tenant Blacklisting Based on Housing Court Records: A
Survey of Approaches, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Aug. 2017, at 1 (discussing how the existence of a recent
housing case can cause landlords to deny applicants housing and can often be the sole factor that tenantscreening bureaus consider when making their recommendations); Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening
Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal to Protect Public Records, 116 YALE L.J. 1344, 1346–50 (2007)
(noting that landlords regularly purchase and rely on tenant-screening reports that reveal landlord–tenant
disputes and court filings).
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extent to which tenants of a given jurisdiction are at risk of a formal order of
eviction. Research has also shown a plethora of adverse consequences that
flow from actual eviction, including, among others, homelessness and
“downward” moves to worse housing conditions.11 Both eviction filings and
actual eviction are also associated with adverse mental and physical health
outcomes, including higher rates of very low birth weight and
infant mortality.12 Much literature has explored the extent to which
sociodemographic and housing market characteristics affect eviction filing
rates and eviction rates.13
Little research, however, has examined the relationship between these
two rates. More specifically, there has been little focus on the eviction rate
11
See, e.g., Robert Collinson & Davin Reed, The Effects of Evictions on Low-Income Households
3, 5 (Oct. 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_
documents/evictions_collinson_reed.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFQ7-D8PU] (explaining how eviction
increases the likelihood of homelessness and causes worsened mental health in adults); Maureen Crane
& Anthony M. Warnes, Evictions and Prolonged Homelessness, 15 HOUS. STUD. 757, 762 (2000)
(discussing the results of a study of forty-five elderly British individuals who cited eviction as a
contributing factor to their homelessness). Where eviction does not lead to homelessness, it often leads
to what are considered “downward” moves—moves to worse housing conditions and/or neighborhoods
with higher rates of poverty and crime. See Matthew Desmond & Tracey Schollenberger, Forced
Displacement from Rental Housing: Prevalence and Neighborhood Consequences, 52 DEMOGRAPHY
1751, 1768 (2015).
12
See Gracie Himmelstein & Matthew Desmond, Association of Eviction with Adverse Birth
Outcomes Among Women in Georgia, 2000 to 2016, 175 JAMA PEDIATRICS 494, 497–98 (2021); Corey
Hazekamp, Sana Yousuf, Kelli Day, Mary Kate Daly & Karen Sheehan, Eviction and Pediatric Health
Outcomes in Chicago, 45 J. CMTY. HEALTH 891, 892, 895, 897–98 (2020); Vásquez-Vera et al., supra
note 9, at 202, 204–06; Kathryn Leifheit & Jacky Jennings, Eviction as a Social Determinant of Sexual
Health Outcomes, 46 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 69, 69 (2019); Allyson E. Gold, No Home for
Justice: How Eviction Perpetuates Health Inequity Among Low-Income and Minority Tenants, 24 GEO.
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 59, 61, 77, 83 (2016); Matthew Desmond & Rachel Tolbert Kimbro,
Eviction’s Fallout: Housing, Hardship, and Health, 94 SOC. FORCES 295, 316, 318 (2015).
13
See, e.g., Preston & Reina, supra note 4, at 806 (finding that in communities with higher shares of
Black and Latino renters, and in those with higher shares of children and households headed by single
mothers, “subsidized housing is associated with lower eviction filing rates relative to market-rate
housing”); Dan Immergluck, Jeff Ernsthausen, Stephanie Earl & Allison Powell, Evictions, Large
Owners, and Serial Filings: Findings From Atlanta, 35 HOUS. STUD. 903, 919 (2020) (finding that larger
owners and larger buildings tend to have higher rates of serial filings, and that nonserial filings are highest
in Black neighborhoods); Benjamin F. Teresa & Kathryn L. Howell, Eviction and Segmented Housing
Markets in Richmond, Virginia, 31 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 627, 641 (2021) (finding that there are housing
submarkets where eviction and the threat of eviction are likely to be worse); Lens et al., supra note 2, at
925 (finding that eviction filings are much more likely to occur in “neighborhoods with higher poverty
rates or shares of African American individuals”). Note that researchers have consistently emphasized
that both the eviction filing rate and the eviction rate fail to capture the full scope of eviction because they
omit informal evictions. Some studies have estimated that informal evictions are more than five times as
common as formal (i.e., court-based) evictions. See Ashley Gromis & Matthew Desmond, Estimating the
Prevalence of Eviction in the United States, 23 CITYSCAPE 279, 281 (2021). Informal evictions are
particularly prevalent among small-scale landlords. See John Balzarini & Melody L. Boyd, Working with
Them: Small-Scale Landlord Strategies for Avoiding Evictions, 31 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 425, 427, 437–
39 (2021).
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relative to the eviction filing rate—that is, the eviction rate per eviction
filing—within a given jurisdiction. This rate, which I term the “court
displacement rate,” measures the percentage of eviction filings that result in
actual eviction. As an example, suppose the Jones, Smith, and Jackson
families are a sample set of households in a jurisdiction. The Smiths and
Jacksons have had eviction proceedings filed against them one time each.
The Jacksons were successfully evicted, but the Smiths were not. The
eviction filing rate, then, is 67%: two out of three tenants faced eviction. The
eviction rate is 33%: one out of three tenants were successfully evicted. And
the court displacement rate is 50%: one eviction out of two eviction filings.
The court displacement rate is a crucial statistic because it helps
pinpoint the role of the jurisdiction’s legal process in actual eviction. In other
words, does the court process—either through its procedures or through the
application of substantive law—simply streamline the conversion of an
eviction filing into actual eviction, or does it play a role in delimiting that
outcome, operating as a meaningful buffer against eviction?
Where court displacement rates are high, it suggests that the eviction
legal system may serve merely to greenlight evictions. Where court
displacement rates are low, it suggests that the eviction legal system may
play a role in blocking desired evictions from going forward. Additionally,
the court displacement rate offers helpful clues into the other roles the
eviction legal system may be playing in the landlord–tenant relationship. In
particular, where court displacement rates are low, it signals the possibility
that eviction filings are being used for nondispossessory purposes, such as to
collect rent or to control tenant behavior.
Until very recently, it was quite difficult to discern court displacement
rates across jurisdictions. Eviction filing rates were largely unknown, with
information about case filings existing only in millions of separate court
records that researchers had yet to compile. The state of our collective
knowledge shifted dramatically in 2018 with the Eviction Lab’s collection
of an extraordinary number of eviction case records across the country. The
Lab published statistics of eviction filing rates by city and state, creating
enormous public visibility into a previously opaque (albeit widespread)
phenomenon. The Lab also published statistics on actual “eviction rates,” but
as scholars, including some involved with the Lab, have noted, these
statistics were less likely to be accurate.14 Court records often contain
14

See Adam Porton, Ashley Gromis & Matthew Desmond, Inaccuracies in Eviction Records:
Implications for Renters & Researchers, 31 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 377, 378 (2021). The authors also
point out that the eviction filing rate is often reflective of serial filings, and thus the eviction filing rate
does not itself reflect the likelihood that a renter in the jurisdiction will face eviction. See id. at 380; see
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imprecise or ambiguous information about outcomes, either failing to
indicate whether a judgment was entered or noting only that a judgment was
entered but not whether the execution (i.e., actual eviction) was stayed
pending the tenant’s compliance with terms.15 Recorded outcomes also often
do not capture settlement agreements in which the tenant agrees to move out
(“move-out agreements”), as such agreements can lack a judgment or
execution. Further, court records can be plainly inaccurate, reflecting false
information due to data inputting errors or other poor recordkeeping.16 In a
review of eviction records from twelve states, Adam Porton and his
coauthors found that, on average, 22% of state eviction records contained
falsities or ambiguities.17
At a more general level, one of the persistent challenges of reporting
eviction rates across multiple jurisdictions at once is that there is a high
degree of variation in the substantive meaning of eviction records. As
previously described, eviction laws and procedures differ significantly
across states, and sometimes even at substate levels, such that there is no
straightforward apples-to-apples comparison of records. In New York City,
for example, an eviction requires a warrant, which must be executed by a
deputy sheriff, city marshal, or constable.18 An appropriate measure of
evictions in New York City is therefore the number of warrants executed by
these officials. Yet warrants are nonexistent in Massachusetts eviction laws.
There, actual evictions take the form of an “issuance of execution,” which is
levied upon by an officer of the court.19 Overall, what is appropriately
counted as an eviction is highly context-specific, and measurement at a
population-wide level often requires hand-coding of eviction files by
someone with local knowledge.
Luckily, in the past several years, many local nonprofit and
governmental organizations have undertaken highly detailed studies of
eviction case outcomes in their own jurisdictions. By digging deep into the
actual case files and carefully combing the court records, researchers have
also Daniela Aiello, Lisa Bates, Terra Graziani, Christopher Herring, Manissa Maharawal, Erin McElroy,
Pamela Phan & Gretchen Purser, Eviction Lab Misses the Mark, SHELTERFORCE (Aug. 22,
2018),
https://shelterforce.org/2018/08/22/eviction-lab-misses-the-mark
[https://perma.cc/4WGD6G4L] (describing the likely inaccuracies in the Eviction Lab’s data and the conflicts between the Lab’s
data and the data compiled by the Anti-Eviction Mapping Project and Tenants Together).
15
Porton et al., supra note 14, at 379–80; Aiello et al., supra note 14. If execution is stayed pending
the tenant’s compliance with terms, it is possible that a judgment was entered but the tenant was not
actually evicted. See Nicole Summers, Civil Probation, 75 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023)
(manuscript at 4) (on file with author).
16
See Porton et al., supra note 14, at 378.
17
Id.
18
See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 749 (McKinney 2019).
19
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 239, § 3 (2021).
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been able to take into account indicia of displacement that are not otherwise
visible in mass court databases. These studies have resulted in far more
precise calculations of the number of actual evictions than were previously
available. This data on actual evictions, combined with the researchers’ as
well as the Eviction Lab’s data on eviction filing rates, for the first time has
enabled reliable computations of court displacement rates.
The existing studies show that court displacement rates vary widely
across jurisdictions. Washington, D.C. has the lowest court displacement
rate—approximately 5.5%—among the jurisdictions with available data.20
New York City also has a relatively low court displacement rate of
approximately 9%–12%.21 Lauren Sudeall and Daniel Pasciuti’s in-depth
research into evictions filed in rural Georgia reveals an approximately 12%
court displacement rate there.22 Yet court displacement rates in other
jurisdictions are much higher. My own research in collaboration with Justin
Steil finds that Boston has a court displacement rate of about 45%.23 And a
number of jurisdictions have court displacement rates above 50%: these
include New Orleans (61%),24 Minneapolis (67%),25 Kansas City (75%),26
and Denver (79%).27 While only representative of a handful of jurisdictions,
the above comparison of court displacement rates side by side makes clear
that eviction courts are distributing, or redistributing, property rights in
widely divergent ways. In some jurisdictions, an eviction filing results in the
stripping of the tenant’s property rights in three out of four cases. In other
jurisdictions, this outcome happens quite rarely, in only approximately one
in twenty or one in ten cases. By far the most common outcome in these latter
20
See BRIAN J. MCCABE & EVA ROSEN, EVICTION IN WASHINGTON, DC: RACIAL AND GEOGRAPHIC
DISPARITIES IN HOUSING INSTABILITY 13 (2020).
21
See OFF. OF CIV. JUST., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS./N.Y.C. HUM. RES. ADMIN., NYC OFFICE
OF CIVIL JUSTICE 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 24, 26 (2020). Nine to twelve percent is the range of court
displacement rates from 2013 to 2019. I do not include 2020 data because during that year New York
City had an eviction moratorium in place. The period from 2013 to 2019 includes some years in which
New York City’s Universal Access to Counsel program had begun to roll out, and some years prior to the
2017 rollout. Id. at 15.
22
Lauren Sudeall & Daniel Pasciuti, Praxis and Paradox: Inside the Black Box of Eviction Court,
74 VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1410 (2021).
23
Dataset on file with author. The number can also be calculated from the data at Summers, supra
note 15, at 25, 37 n.170. The eviction rate of 45% is the sum of the percentages of cases resulting in
move-out agreements (19%), default judgments (15%), judgments for the landlord after trial (3%), and
evictions for violation of civil probation (9%). Although the rounded percentages sum to 46%, the raw
numbers sum to 45%.
24
Davida Finger, The Eviction Geography of New Orleans: An Empirical Study to Further Housing
Justice, 22 U.D.C. L. REV. 23, 35 (2019).
25
THIEL, supra note 2, at 2.
26
Project, supra note 2.
27
HASVOLD & REGENBOGEN, supra note 2, at 2.
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jurisdictions is that the tenant retains physical and legal possession of the
premises. Overall, these outcomes reflect that eviction legal systems across
jurisdictions distribute property rights between landlords and tenants in
dramatically different ways.
II. UNDERSTANDING DIVERGENT EVICTION COURT OUTCOMES:
AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The divergent court displacement rates presented above raise the
obvious question of why eviction legal systems perform so differently across
jurisdictions. As Kathryn Sabbeth has demonstrated, eviction courts tend to
share a number of characteristics across jurisdictions.28 Among other
features, eviction courts are generally characterized by relatively low filing
fees, default judgment rules that favor landlords, limitations on discovery,
and rules that create obstacles to appeals.29 Yet despite these general
similarities, there exists a certain degree of variation in the substantive laws
eviction courts apply, their procedural rules, and their structures. Sociologist
Megan Hatch has developed a typology of substantive eviction laws,
classifying state landlord–tenant policy approaches into three categories:
“protectionist,” with laws that are generally pro-tenant; “contradictory,” with
laws that contain a mix of protections for tenants and landlords; and
“probusiness,” with laws that are more favorable to landlords.30 Eviction
procedures likewise vary substantially.31 In some jurisdictions, the entire
eviction process can take place in a week, whereas in others, it lasts longer
than a month at minimum.32 Some states require tenants to post bond in the
amount of their rental arrears with the court in order to raise defenses to the
eviction, whereas other states’ laws contain no such requirement.33 Similarly,
access-to-justice factors within eviction courts range widely—in some
28

Kathryn Sabbeth, Eviction Courts, 18 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 359, 377 (2022).
Id. at 376–84. The other features of eviction courts that Sabbeth identifies are shortened
timeframes, substandard service methods, limits on defenses and counterclaims available to tenants, rent
bonds, laws that preclude access to legal services for tenants, and judges with limited legal training. Id.
30
See Megan E. Hatch, Statutory Protection for Renters: Classification of State Landlord–Tenant
Policy Approaches, 27 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 98, 109–11 (2017).
31
See generally Kyle Nelson, Philip Garboden, Brian J. McCabe & Eva Rosen, Evictions: The
Comparative Analysis Problem, 31 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 696, 701–08 (2021) (describing differences in
eviction procedures across four jurisdictions).
32
See Finger, supra note 24, at 32 (describing that in New Orleans the entire eviction process can
take place within a week); Nelson et al., supra note 31, at 702–03 (describing that in Texas the entire
eviction process can unfold within two weeks, whereas in Maryland it takes two months); Summers,
supra note 15, at 19–20 (describing that in Massachusetts the eviction process typically lasts at least one
month from service of the predicate notice to the execution of the eviction).
33
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 83.60 (2013) (requiring rent bonds in Florida); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1167.3 (not requiring rent bonds in California).
29
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jurisdictions, for example, nearly all landlords are represented and tenants
have a right to counsel, whereas in others, the majority of both landlords and
tenants are pro se.34 In short, it is clear that eviction legal systems are
different across jurisdictions, and thus it is understandable that outcomes—
as measured by the court displacement rate—vary as well.
But the question that eviction scholars need to address is which specific
parts of the eviction legal system matter, and matter most, in determining
systemic outcomes. Research has shown that the overall pro-tenant or prolandlord leaning of the jurisdiction matters, but that tells us little about the
specific laws that make a difference.35 It also fails to solve a clear puzzle
presented by the available data: why court displacement rates vary so
dramatically among jurisdictions with the same policy approach (as
determined by Hatch’s classification system). Boston and New York City,
for example, both have protectionist (pro-tenant) policies, yet Boston’s court
displacement rate is over four times that of New York City.36 Among the
protectionist jurisdictions with reliable data, court displacement rates range
from around 10% (New York City) to 67% (Minneapolis). Court
displacement rates among probusiness jurisdictions similarly range widely,
from approximately 12% in rural Georgia to 79% in Denver.
As an initial matter, there may be jurisdictional differences independent
of the eviction legal system that affect court displacement rates. First,
differences in court displacement rates could be due, in large or small part,
to jurisdictional differences in landlords’ predilections to file for eviction. In
some jurisdictions, because of low court filing fees and other factors,
researchers have found that landlords have particularly minimal thresholds
for eviction filing.37 In these jurisdictions, landlords readily file for eviction
even where only small amounts of rent are owed, often because it is not

34
See Ericka Petersen, Building a House for Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Evictions, 16 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 63, 78 (2020) (describing that the vast majority of tenants in eviction proceedings are
unrepresented); OFF. OF CIV. JUST., supra note 21, at 15 (describing New York City legislation
establishing universal access to counsel for tenants facing eviction); Sudeall & Pasciuti, supra note 22, at
1400 (reporting that in rural Georgia landlord representation rates are approximately 4%–12%). Other
“access to justice factors” may include the judging model followed, the extent to which judges pressure
the parties to settle, and the volume of case dockets. See Nelson et al., supra note 31, at 704–05.
35
See Nelson et al., supra note 31, at 701–08.
36
See Hatch, supra note 30, at 109–11; supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text.
37
See Nelson et al., supra note 31, at 703–04. Other factors may include legal structures that do not
require landlords to serve a predicate notice prior to initiating an eviction filing for nonpayment of rent
eviction. This legal structure, which exists in Maryland, is thought to dramatically expand the number of
eviction filings by allowing landlords to initiate the eviction process immediately upon any amount of
rent becoming past due. See id. at 702–03.

297

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

costly to do so.38 For example, in Washington, D.C., the eviction filing fee is
only $15, and researchers attribute D.C.’s high eviction filing rate to this low
fee.39 In other jurisdictions, particularly where court filing fees are higher,
landlords exhibit less inclination to file for eviction.40 These differences may
well reflect differences in landlords’ preferences for actual eviction upon
filing—where landlords file for eviction based on small amounts of rent
owed, they may be less interested in obtaining actual eviction than where
larger amounts are owed. Indeed, qualitative research has found that
landlords frequently file for eviction with the goal of collecting rent or
reforming tenant behavior rather than to displace their tenants.41 Where
actual eviction is not the goal, landlords often engage in the practice of
“serial eviction filing”—repeatedly filing against the same household as a
form of threat in order to coerce rental payments.42 Put simply, if low filing
fees or other factors in a jurisdiction result in landlords readily filing for
eviction as a means to collect small amounts of rent, then the jurisdiction is
likely to have a low court displacement rate.43 That rate, however, will reflect
little about the role of the eviction legal process in buffering against actual
eviction; it instead simply reflects landlords’ use of the eviction process for
alternative, nondispossessory ends.
While more research is needed to pinpoint the precise role of landlord
predilection for eviction filing in driving court displacement rates, surface
comparisons suggest that it is far from fully deterministic. Studies of New
York City and Minneapolis revealed that eviction complaints in both
jurisdictions sought, on average, approximately two to three months of rental
arrears (indicating a similar landlord predilection for eviction filing in both
places), yet Minneapolis’s court displacement rate (67%) is over six times
higher than that of New York City (9–12%).44 And the average amount of
38
Id. at 703–04 (reporting results of statistical analysis showing that “the [eviction] filing rate is
negatively associated with the [eviction] filing fee across cities”).
39
See MCCABE & ROSEN, supra note 20, at 28.
40
See Nelson et al., supra note 31, at 703–04.
41
See Philip ME Garboden & Eva Rosen, Serial Filing: How Landlords Use the Threat of Eviction,
18 CITY & CMTY. 638, 639 (2019); Leung et al., supra note 4, at 338; Immergluck et al., supra note 13,
at 920.
42
Leung et al., supra note 4, at 317–21.
43
It is also possible that substantive landlord–tenant laws affect eviction filing rates by encouraging
or discouraging landlords from initiating cases in the first place. Where landlords desire actual eviction,
strongly protective eviction laws may make landlords more reluctant to attempt eviction, whereas less
protective laws may increase landlord willingness to file.
44
See N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., TRENDS IN NEW YORK CITY HOUSING COURT EVICTION
FILINGS 6 (2019), https://furmancenter.org/files/publications/NYUFurmanCenter_TrendsInHousing
CourtFilings.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E9R-JQQL] (finding that evictions in private housing sought on
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rental arrears sought in eviction complaints is nearly identical in
Washington, D.C. ($1,207) and New Orleans ($1,230), but Washington,
D.C. has one of the lowest court displacement rates (5.5%) and New Orleans
has one of the highest (64%).45 Were landlord willingness to file eviction
cases the primary driver of court displacement rates, we would expect to see
much greater convergence across jurisdictions with similar amounts of rent
on the eviction complaint (as this amount reflects landlord predilection
for filing).
Second, differences in housing markets may also impact court
displacement rates. A growing body of literature reveals differences in
eviction filing practices by landlord type. More specifically, quantitative
research has shown that large-scale landlords and landlords of certain
subsidized properties file for eviction more frequently than smaller-scale
landlords and landlords of unsubsidized units.46 Researchers have also
consistently found that landlords’ eviction filing practices are racially
disproportionate, with landlords filing for eviction at higher rates in
neighborhoods with larger concentrations of nonwhite residents as compared
with neighborhoods with larger shares of white residents.47 These differences
in eviction filing practices may inflate or deflate the denominator of the court
displacement rate, resulting in lower or higher rates that are not due to any
meaningful differences in the eviction legal system but instead flow from
differences in landlord behavior and objectives. Similarly, we might expect
that court displacement rates are merely a function of the affordability and
tightness of rental markets, with high-cost markets resulting in higher court
displacement rates because landlords have a greater incentive to turn
over properties.
Surface comparisons again paint a perplexing picture. Boston and
New York City are both high-cost rental markets with low vacancy rates and
average 2.5 to 3 months’ rent); THIEL, supra note 2, at 2 (finding that eviction complaints on average
sought two months of rental arrears). The fact that eviction complaints in New York City sought a slightly
greater number of months of arrears as compared with Minneapolis makes the divergent court
displacement rates even more perplexing, as one would expect that a higher arrears amount (indicative of
a lower landlord willingness for eviction filing) would be associated with a higher court displacement
rate. Yet New York City has a significantly lower court displacement rate than Minneapolis.
45
See MCCABE & ROSEN, supra note 20, at 6; Finger, supra note 24, at 36.
46
See Henry Gomroy, The Social and Institutional Contexts Underlying Landlords’ Eviction
Practices, 100 SOC. FORCES 1774, 1775, 1788 (2021) (concluding “that large-scale landlords file and
evict at two to three times the rates of small-scale owners,” and that “medium[-scale] landlords evict 47
percent more,” controlling for property characteristics); Preston & Reina, supra note 4, at 800 (finding
“that tenants in public housing and in [project-based Section 8 subsidized] properties are, respectively,
21–68% and 52–76% less likely to experience an eviction filing than are tenants in similar market-rate
properties”); Immergluck et al., supra note 13, at 921 (finding “that larger owners and owners of larger
properties are more likely to be serial [eviction] filers”).
47
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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a high percentage of cost-burdened households,48 yet Boston has a 45% court
displacement rate compared to New York City’s 9–12% rate. Denver’s
housing market can also be characterized similarly to Boston’s and New
York City’s,49 and its court displacement rate is 79%. Again, while housing
market characteristics quite likely play some role in court displacement rates,
the data suggests that the rates are far from wholly determinative.
Research is sorely needed to unpack the reasons behind the variation in
court displacement rates. It would certainly be helpful to more rigorously
interrogate the roles of background jurisdictional characteristics (e.g.,
landlord predilection for filing and housing market) in determining court
displacement rates. Yet we also need much more detailed, in-depth research
on how various components of the eviction legal system drive outcomes.
Scholarship assessing the inputs of the eviction legal system has centered
mainly on two of them: access to counsel for tenants and the strength of the
jurisdiction’s implied warranty of habitability laws.50 This scholarship is
48
See CARRIE BERNSTEIN, CALANDRA CLARK, IAN DINNIE, TOM HOPPER, MARK MELNIK, ABBY
RAISZ & CLARK ZIEGLER, THE BOS. FOUND., THE GREATER BOSTON HOUSING REPORT CARD 2021, at
10, 42 (2021), https://www.tbf.org/-/media/tbf/reports-and-covers/2021/gbhrc2021_final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TWL4-EM6A] (showing data that 23% of renter households in Greater Boston are severely cost
burdened and describing persistently low vacancy rates in the Greater Boston area); Tom Acitelli, Nearly
Half of Boston-Area Tenant Households ‘Cost-Burdened,’ Report Says, CURBED BOS. (Oct. 9, 2019, 1:53
PM),
https://boston.curbed.com/2019/10/9/20906570/boston-tenants-cost-burdened
[https://
perma.cc/3HZR-R6ML]; State of the City 2021: State of Renters and Their Homes, N.Y.U. FURMAN
CTR., https://furmancenter.org/stateofthecity/view/state-of-renters-and-their-homes [https://perma.cc/
25TU-3TSP] (presenting data showing that approximately 26% of renter households in New York City
are severely cost burdened while rental shares increased in New York similarly to the national rate).
49
See Kelcey McClung, Half of Denver’s Renters Are Cost Burdened, Report Says, DENVER BUS. J.
(Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2017/12/18/half-of-denvers-renters-are-costburdened-report.html [https://perma.cc/VNN6-MNVH] (describing findings from Harvard University’s
Joint Center for Housing Studies that half of Denver’s renters spend at least 30% of their income on
housing); Denver Among Top 10 U.S. Cities with Highest Income Needed to Pay Rent, CBS NEWS (Aug.
11, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/colorado/news/denver-ranked-top-10-cities-income-pay-rent/
[https://perma.cc/JAZ9-BTPM] (describing study findings showing Denver, Boston, and New York City
as three of the top ten cities with the highest income needed to pay for a two-bedroom apartment).
50
See, e.g., Michael T. Cassidy & Janet Currie, The Effects of Legal Representation on Tenant
Outcomes in Housing Court: Evidence from New York City’s Universal Access Program 1–3 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 29836, 2022) (studying the effectiveness of access to legal
representation for tenants facing eviction in New York City); Ingrid Gould Ellen, Katherine O’Regan,
Sophia House & Ryan Brenner, Do Lawyers Matter? Early Evidence on Eviction Patterns After the
Rollout of Universal Access to Counsel in New York City, 31 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 540 (2021)
(examining the effects of access to legal representation on eviction case outcomes); Carroll Seron, Martin
Frankel, Gregg Van Ryzin & Jean Kovath, The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants
in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419,
426 (2001) (showing that tenant access to counsel affects outcomes); D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos
Pattanayak & Jonathan Hennessy, The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a
Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 906–09, 959 (2013)
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highly valuable, but it leaves unexplored a multitude of factors that
potentially contribute in significant ways to the divergences in overall court
displacement rates.
First, research should explore the role of procedural rules in eviction
outcomes. Do jurisdictions with eviction processes that involve multiple
court events have lower court displacement rates compared with similar
jurisdictions with only a single court event? For example, it may be the case
that having an initial court date before the trial date lowers court
displacement rates because it facilitates settlement. But the opposite may
also result: perhaps two court dates simply increases the probability that the
tenant will default at one of them, thereby increasing the court displacement
rate. Relatedly, to what extent do answer requirements or different default
judgment rules correlate with court displacement rates?51 Does a jury trial
right for tenants matter? Procedural rules should be closely examined across
jurisdictions to better understand what differences exist and to what extent
those differences correlate with differences in court displacement rates.52
Second, research should interrogate whether and to what extent
variations in specific substantive laws drive the differences in court
displacement rates. As described above, the same overall landlord–tenant
policy approach—whether protectionist, contradictory, or probusiness—is
associated with different court displacement rates. Clearly, we need to dig
deeper into the specific substantive laws that matter for outcomes. As
mentioned, a good deal of scholarship has empirically examined as well as
theorized the role of warranty of habitability laws in eviction outcomes.53 In
prior research, I have hypothesized that laws affording tenants an extended
right-to-cure period affect court outcomes, but researchers have only begun
to examine this question empirically.54 Aside from this scholarship, there has
been little inquiry into the role of specific substantive laws in driving court
displacement. Among other inquiries, researchers should examine the extent
(studying the impact of full legal representation on eviction outcomes); Serge Martinez, Revitalizing the
Implied Warranty of Habitability, 34 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 239, 272, 276, 279 (2020)
(arguing that strengthening the implied warranty of habitability doctrine would change eviction
outcomes); David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
389, 458–63 (2011) (discussing the effects of the implied warranty of habitability on housing issues).
51
Some jurisdictions do not require tenants to file an answer in order to avoid default. See, e.g.,
MASS. UNIF. SUMMARY PROCESS R. 10(a) (“If the defendant appears but has failed to file a timely answer,
no default shall enter . . . .”).
52
I propose performing correlational rather than causational estimates simply because I think it
would be difficult to design a study that would allow for causational conclusions to be drawn. However,
to the extent such study design is feasible, causational conclusions are of course preferable.
53
See supra note 50.
54
See Summers, supra note 15, at 63–64; Nicole Summers, The Limits of Good Law: A Study of
Housing Court Outcomes, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 145, 215–17 (2020).

301

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

to which fair housing laws, laws providing tenants equitable defenses to
eviction, and other laws recognizing substantive eviction defenses correlate
with court displacement rates.
Third, we should seek to understand how court structures and accessto-justice factors affect court displacement rates. As described, researchers
have examined the effects of access to counsel for tenants, but aside from
this body of literature there has been little empirical study of other factors
related to court design and access. Does simplification of court procedures
correlate with lower court displacement rates? Do mandatory mediation or
other forms of alternative dispute resolution affect outcomes? To what extent
does co-locating social services (e.g., rental assistance, services for tenants
with disabilities) matter? And what is the role of legal technology?
Commentators have advocated for, and in many cases jurisdictions are
experimenting with, all of these “solutions” for lowering court displacement
rates, but we do not yet have rigorous empirical evidence about whether they
result in meaningful differences in outcomes (in other words, whether they
are effective).55
CONCLUSION
The wide variation in court displacement rates across jurisdictions
should be seen as an invitation to explore what is working and what is not
when it comes to court-based displacement. Research should seek to
understand why Boston’s court displacement rate is so much higher than
New York’s, why Washington, D.C.’s rate is so shockingly low, and why
Minneapolis’s and Denver’s rates are so high. What is “working”—from the
perspective of tenant displacement—in Washington, D.C. and New York?
And why does nearly everyone who receives an eviction filing get evicted in
Denver? Court displacement rates are not a tell-all statistic, and they are
undoubtedly influenced by factors outside the eviction legal system itself,
such as the local housing market and landlords’ readiness to file for eviction
in the jurisdiction. But to the extent the eviction legal system influences court
55

See, e.g., PANDEMIC RAPID RESPONSE TEAM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., FIVE KEY ASPECTS
COURT CO-LOCATED RESIDENTIAL EVICTION DIVERSION PROGRAMS 1–9 (2022),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/71914/Eviction-diversion-whitepaper-Jan.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q44N-2X6W] (describing the use of co-located services in eviction courts across jurisdictions
as a tool to reduce evictions); Sherley E. Cruz, Coding for Cultural Competency: Expanding Access to
Justice with Technology, 86 TENN. L. REV. 347, 349 (2019) (arguing that legal technology can improve
outcomes for tenants in eviction proceedings); Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Simplicity as Justice, 2018 WIS. L.
REV. 287, 288 (describing the push towards simplification of court procedures in “poor people’s courts,”
including eviction courts); Gerald Lebovits & Lucero Ramirez Hidalgo, Alternative Dispute Resolution
in Real Estate Matters: The New York Experience, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 437, 437–38, 450–
51 (2009) (describing the rise of the use of alternative dispute resolution in the New York City
Housing Court).
FOR
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displacement rates at all—which, I have argued, it very likely does—we
should endeavor to figure out what those influences are. Doing so will lead
us towards evidence-based policy solutions for addressing the eviction crisis.
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